La paix penible de 1923

Part of : Balkan studies : biannual publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies ; Vol.39, No.1, 1998, pages 71-89

Parallel Title:
The painful peace of 1923
Section Title:
The aim of this article is the analysis of the Venizelian and Allied policyin Asia Minor from 1919 to the treaty of 1923. Making an extensive use of primary sources, the writer brings forward that Venizelos was authorized byBritain and France to land Greek forces at Smyrna in 1919; but he compliedwith without asking for guarantees in the event of having to fight a singlehandedwar with Turkey. The Greek landing coincided with the decision ofKemal to fight for “Turkey to the Turks”. Thus, the Treaty of Sèvres, whichBritain hurriedly induced France and Italy to sign in 1920, was a peace onlyon paper and could not be enforced save by a long war.Having been unseated in that same year, Venizelos, from his exile,realized the dangerous involvement of Greece in Anatolia and he repeatedlyinsisted on the British support of Constantine and on the political world inGreece the necessity of withdrawing the troops from Smyrna. The refusal ofthe Greek government proved only calamitous. Venizelos was called upon bythe Greek government to save the wreckage at Lausanne and sign the painfulTreaty of 1923.The writer reaches the conclusion that the Greek army without resourcespursuing a lone war with Turkey collapsed. But the policy of the French andthe Italian governments had been chiefly responsible for its disaster.
Subject (LC):
The painful peace of 1923