German defensive policy in the Balkans, a case study : The buildup in Greece, 1943
Part of : Balkan studies : biannual publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies ; Vol.23, No.2, 1982, pages 404-420
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404-420
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Following the collapse of Romme'.’s "orces in North Africa andthe Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria (November 1942) Hitler and the German High Command began to worry about the securityof the vulnerable and weakly defended southern tier of their «FestungEuropa». This concern centered on the Balkans, and most importantly,Greece. Indeed, throughout 1943, the Germans made a genuine effortto reinforce their position in Greece and throughout the Balkans; andthe buildup accellerated in May 1943, following the success of an ingeniousBritish «ruse de guerre» designed to mislead the German HighCommand on the eve of the Allied invasion of Sicily.My essay traces the nature of the German buildup in some detail;it also attempts to clarify the strategic assumptions of Hitler and hisadvisors upon which the buildup was based. I will argue that, in 1943,the Balkans were an area of primary strategic concern for the Germans,and that fear of major Amglo-American operation in the areawas very great. I will attempt to demonstrate, however, that Germanfears vis-a-vis the Balkans were predicated upon some fundamentinaccurate assumptions about the nature of, and tensions within, theAllied coalitionMy essay is based principally upon unpublished German miliratyrecords - war diaries, intelligent assessments, situation reports, etc. As far as I know, it is the first attempt by a historian to trace the German military buildup in Greee in 1943 in great detail.
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