Το «παράδοξο» της πρότασης 6.54 : ο σκοπός του Tractatus
Part of : Δευκαλίων : περιοδική έκδοση για τη φιλοσοφική έρευνα και κριτική ; Vol.27, No.1-2, 2010, pages 144-192
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144-192
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The «paradox» of 6.54 : the aim of the Tractatus
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In the present article propose a reading of proposition 6.54 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, a proposition which characterizes the very propositions of the book as nonsense. This reading differs from the two dominant ones given in the literature, namely, those by P.M. S. Hacker and C. Diamond. I argue that the propositions of the book do have sense (in an ordinary use of the term) and that the term «nonsense» in 6.54 is a technical one, such that it is useless for the reader when he has understood the book’s aim. The uselessness of the propositions in which the term is used, - including proposition 6.54-, to those who have understood the aim of the book, can be compared to the uselessness of the clarifications given for the use of a word to those who already know how to use it. I also suggest that, to a significant extent, the book’s aim involves an implied ethical imperative of ant dogmatism, which seems to be related to the non-austere delineation of concepts in the natural languages compared to the technical ones
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