87-114

Side-effects and moral responsibility : ascribing responsibility in the absence of intention

• Ντούσκος, Χρίστος

Several philosophers claim that the concept of intentional action is colored by our concern to ascribe moral responsibility. This presents a problem. If our characterizing an action as intentional is influenced byour apprehension of its moral qualities, then the rationale for ascribing responsibility, which typically revolves around the question of whether the action was intentional, would beg the question against the agent. The solution offered stems from the idea that in contexts of moral evaluation the ascription of mental states, which impinge on whether the action is intentional, is itself subject to normative considerations: we expect an agent to know certain things and draw the relevant conclusions (“she should have known better”). Hence the criteria for characterizing an action as intentional are derived from the general standards of mental alertness and consistency we expect from rational agents. This allows us to construe a non question-begging rationale for ascribing responsibility

• Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

• Θεωρία (Φιλοσοφία)
• Φιλοσοφία
• Ethics