Η δικαιολόγηση των εμπειρικών πεποιθήσεων : σκιαγράφηση μιας «κριτικής» πλαισιοκρατικής αντίληψης
Part of : Δευκαλίων : περιοδική έκδοση για τη φιλοσοφική έρευνα και κριτική ; Vol.28, No.1, 2011, pages 32-63
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32-63
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The justification of our empirical beliefs : outline of a “critical” contextualist viewpoint
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This paper focuses on the structural core of foundationalism and coherentist theories of empirical justification and highlights a shared questionable background assumption concerning the structure of justification which makes both of them versions of what Michael Williams calls «epistemological realism”. It is further argued that this latter, essentially “a-contextual”, view about the structure of justification is a version of “the myth of the Given”, and that this conception, in turn, far from being self-evident, is in fact a theoretical construct tailored to satisfy a traditional epistemological requirement that allegedly ought to be satisfied if empirical justification is to be non-circular: the epistemic priority requirement. However, this requirement can only be «satisfied” by skepticism. It is further suggested that a resolutely contextualist view which rejects the myth of the Given in all its forms is the most satisfactory response to the problem of empirical justification, and an attempt is made to defend this view against the charge of relativism. I argue that the fact that justification can only be conducted from within an already existing and functioning conceptual system does not have any relativist implications because it is entirely compatible with the possibility of epistemically criticizing a conceptual system as a whole from the standpoint of another such system
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