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• Μάντακας, Γιώργος Μ.

Regulation of banking behavior has been widespread in Greece. We believe, that if there exists uncertainty over the regulation timing, the banks tend to make behavioral decisions which carry over to the periods where the regulation has been lifted and therefore, cause nonoptimal results both during the regulation period (which is expected) and the period when the regulation has been lifted.

• Economics and Business
• Computer and information sciences

• Finance
• Statistics

Περιέχει σημειώσεις και βιβλιογραφία, I would like to thank Nikos Melianitis, Dinos Vrondas and Th. Karagiannopoulos for all the help they provided me in order to thoroughly understand the greek regulatory "system". Also, special thanks are owed to an anonymous referee. All errors remain the responsibility of the author.