3-12

• Θωμαΐδης, Μ.
• Βαρσακέλης, Νικόλαος Χ.

The present paper develops an equilibrium model of a partially unionized firm that is a monopolist in product market. The firm - union bargaining follows the efficient bargaining process. They bargain simultaneously over the employment level and the unionized wage taking the non-unionized labor employed by the firm as given, while the agent takes the bargaining process as given and chooses the quantity of labor which maximizes his profits. We use the model to examine the comparative statics effects of the unions bargaining power, the "competitive" wage paid to the non-unionized workers and the union's orientation on the bargained wage and the employment level. Applying a Nash cooperative bargaing process we found that the effect of a change in the competitive wage and the increase in the wage elasticity of the union will be posistive both on equilibrium wage and employment. The effect, however, of a change in the bargaining power of the firm, will be positive for the wage rate but for the employment depends on whether the union is wage or employment-oriented.

• Economics and Business
• Computer and information sciences

• Economics
• Statistics

Περιέχει παράρτημα και βιβλιογραφία, We express our gratitude the colleagues of the economics seminar of the Department of Economics, University of Thessaloniki and to an anonymous referee of this journal, for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.