

THE MEANING OF "Ο ΛΟΓΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ,"
IN CATEGORIES 1a 1-2, 7.

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the meaning of the troublesome Aristotelian expression $\delta\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ as it occurs at the very opening of **Categories** 1a 1-2, 7. That the passage has presented serious difficulties to commentators and translators alike can be easily ascertained through a survey and comparison of the relevant literature. It would seem from the disagreements among translators that the passage is either vague in the original Greek or that Aristotle did not have a special doctrine to put across at the very opening such that would require technical formulations that would comply with the ontology presented in this treatise.

The main body of this paper is given to an examination of the diverse difficulties the passage raises in connection with the doctrine of **homonymy** and the ontology which supports it. On the basis of this analysis, and after consideration of the available evidence, textual and historical, attention is given to the possibility of proving the thesis that $\delta\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ (hereafter abbreviated as **L of O**, **L** for **logos** and **O** for **ousia**) has a special doctrinal meaning and is, therefore, free from terminological imprecision. Accordingly, the interpretation defended in this paper advocates a definite reading for **logos** and for **ousia**, and one that forbids a strict identification of **ousia** with the variant meaning of **tode ti** (individual existents or particular substances) ¹, let alone taking liberties with the notion so that it may include in its denotation the **symbebekota** (accidental properties). More pointedly, an argument is presented

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1) **Cat.** 3b 10; **Post. An.** 73b 7, 87b 29.

in favor of interpreting **ousia** to mean substance in the sense of species, on the ground that only in this sense is **ousia** definable ¹.

The thesis that the expression **L of O** has a precise and technical meaning can be put as follows: if we admit that **ousia** can occur as both subject and predicate, and that as ultimate subject it denotes individual substances whereas as predicate it ranges in denotation from **infima species** to **summa genera**, it can be shown that Aristotle means to say in this context that **ousia** must be understood in the sense of being (a) definable and (b) predicable. If so, then, it can only mean secondary substance, with the added restriction that the highest genera be excluded on account of their undefinability. The context of the first chapter is unmistakably one in which **homonymy** is presented and explained as a topic highly requisite to the ontology that undergirds the general doctrine presented in the **Categories**.

Now, in order to establish the validity of our proposed thesis two things would have to be shown:

a) **Logos** as it occurs in this passage must be understood as meaning strictly definition. This aspect of our problem has, admittedly, only antiquarian interest, since there is hardly any scholar today who is willing to propose alternative meanings. However, the issue must be raised if only because what is now universally agreed upon and constitutes accepted reading was an issue of high controversy among the ancient commentators. The expositors of Aristotle's doctrines on this issue, from Porphyry to Photius, made every effort to bend **logos** to mean **description** of substance. The reasons why this additional reading was eagerly defended by every ancient commentator no doubt deserve the length of a separate paper but need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that our interpretation demands that such broadened views concerning **logos** be rejected as non-Aristotelian. All that is needed to be said here is that if **logos** means both definition and description, then **ousia** has to be understood in the most inclusive sense, i. e., capable of denoting anything in any of the categories, which readily leads to the conclusion that the entire expression **L of O** is obviously lacking in terminological precision. The commentators completely missed the significance of this point.

b) Our own proposed interpretation takes fully into account and is in agreement with Aristotle's views on definition as found in the **Topics** and the **Sophistici Elenchi**. The only assumption that is being made here is that the theory of definition present in these works holds true for the **Categories** and that the theory must have been formulated, even if not written down, prior to the actual composition of the **Categories**.

1) For **infima species**, **Post. An.** 73a 32 and **Post. An.**, *passim*. It must be remembered that unless **ousia** means species, **infima** or otherwise, it cannot be defined. **Post. An.** 83b 5.

We are now ready to undertake an examination of a number of translations from the Greek to determine whether the translators have actually succeeded in preserving the technical meaning we believe the passage has. If it can be shown that this is not the case, then we would be justified in drawing the inference that, like the commentators, the translators have similarly failed to see that Aristotle was putting across a strict doctrinal issue ¹.

We have sampled for discussion the following five translations (abbreviated T1 . . . T5) the key expression $\delta\ \delta\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\mu\alpha\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$:

1) The contrast between the ancient commentators and the modern translators deserves further comment. The ancients apparently failed to appreciate the full technical import of the expression **L of O** mainly because they were over-explicating the two terms of the expression, **logos** and **ousia**. They discussed the terms in the light of considerations that more often than not were those of Aristotle. This is especially true in the case of their reading into **logos** the sense of description. They extended **logos** to mean description mainly because they knew that under **homonyma** things one could include just about everything, from individual substances and accidents to secondary substances and the highest genera. But by repeatedly emphasizing this fact they developed an approach, quite broad to be sure, but one that never quite alerted them to the possibility that Aristotle might have used in this case a limited application of **homonyma**. In other words, the commentators give no indication that Aristotle might not have planned to discuss in the opening of the **Categories** all types of **homonyma** things. Evidently, the expression «homonyma things» is a homonymous expression itself, for the expression is used for things that are substantially different: accidents, substances, genera, principles. By applying Aristotle's own rules, it can be shown that if we were to give the definitions of the various sorts of things that are called **homonyma** we would have to give in each case a different definition. But again this is something the commentators knew quite well. It is also clear that Aristotle was well aware of this peculiarity. If so, then it is difficult to understand why would Aristotle want to state something as all that and above all open the discussion in the **Categories** with a circumlocution of **homonyma** to refer unqualifiedly to all cases of homonymy. This wider scope of homonymy one has already learned from the other parts of the **Organon**, especially the treatises that deal with persuasion, rhetoric and fallacies due to the abuse of language. It is more reasonable to suppose that Aristotle in writing the first chapter of the **Categories** was not interested in restating familiar matters. Rather, he was concentrating on stating a technical doctrine with a restricted application of **homonyma** things. What is argued therefore here is not that Aristotle did not know and thus could not have meant the broader meaning of **homonyma**: rather it is claimed that in the case of the **Categories** the need for such unqualified use does not arise and that the special demands of the topic are such that unless a technically restricted formulation of **homonyma** is given at the very beginning, unnecessary confusion about the doctrine of categories might result. Now, when we turn to our modern translators, our analysis shows that their error lies in their leaving **ousia** — not **logos** — so unspecified as to fail to convey the possibility that Aristotle might have meant the expression in the restricted way proposed in this paper. Finally, these translations do not by any means make it easy for the reader to suspect that there is a basic correlation between the nature of **homonyma** and the general theory of categories.

- T1 : «the definition (of substance according to name) is different» ¹.
T2 : «the definition corresponding with the name differs in each case» ².
T3 : «the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different» ³.
T4 : «the definition given for the name in each case is different» ⁴.
T5 : «the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different» ⁵.

1) **The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle, with the Introduction of Porphyry.** Literally translated with notes, syllogistic examples, analysis, and introduction. By Octavius Friere Owen. 2. vols., (London : 1882), pp. 1—2 ; «Things are termed homonymous, of which the name alone is common, but the definition (of substance according to the name) is different ; thus 'man' and 'the picture of a man' are each termed 'animal', since of these, the name alone is common, but the definition (of the substance according to the name) is different».

2) **The Works of Aristotle**, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Vol. I, **Categoriae and De Interpretatione** (Oxford University Press, 1928). The translation has been made from Bekker's text of 1831. The translator states in the Preface that «My chief authority in matters of interpretation has been Pacius ; I have also consulted Waitz's commentary largely». E. M. Edghill translates the passage as follows :

«Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs in each case. Thus a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal' ; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each».

3) Aristotle, **The Organon, I. : The Categories. On Interpretation**, translated by Harold P. Cooke, (Harvard University Press, Loeb, 1838), p. 13. It is stated in the «Preface» that the text printed in the present edition is Bekker's, except for some slight deviations what are noted in the foot of the page. Gooke preserves the reading of L of O : «Things are equivocally named when they have the name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly both be called 'animals', these are equivocally named. For they have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name being different».

4) Aristotle, **Categories and Interpretation**, translated by Le Roy F. Smith, (Academy Guild Press, Fresno, California, 1959). In a prefatory note, the translator states the following : «This is a new translation of the Greek text taking into account the scholastic tradition, the writings of St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas and the latin version of Moerbeke. In a few instances some of the examples which Aristotle gives have been alightly altered to make them more easily understandable by an English reader». The edition of the Greek text is not specified. The translation runs as follows : «Things are named equivocally when they have only the name in common, but the definition given for the name in each case is different. For example, a man and a portrait are both called alive. They have only the name in common, but the definition given for the name different in the two cases».

5) Aristotle's **Categories and De Interpretatione**. Translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill, (Oxford, 1963), p. 3. In his «Preface», the translator states : «The text

It is evident that not all translations agree. The reason must be sought in the fact that they are based on different textual traditions. Even those that belong to the same tradition apparently do not derive the same meaning from their text. We are thus faced with two problems : (a) To Identify the two textual traditions and decide in favor of that which is less confusing and closer to the doctrine the treatise intends. (b) To cut through the maze of the interpretations lurking behind the translations in order to determine, if possible, the exact meaning of the passage.

The first thing to note is that all translations accept **logos** as part of the expression take it to mean definition, and hence no longer consider it important to discuss it as the ancients did. Secondly, the five versions form three different sets : The first set, consisting of T₁ (Owen) and T₃ (Cooke), accepts rather tentatively the **L of O** part and cautiously brackets the expression ; the second, T₂ (Edghill) and T₄ (Smith), openly rejects it ¹. Only the third, that is, T₅ (Ackrill), gives it unreserved endorsement. Finally, none of the translations makes it unambiguously clear that the passage in which **L of O** occurs is embedded in a terminology highly pertinent to Aristotle's ontology and practice of scientific reasoning. Finally, all these renditions leave much to be desired in exactness of meaning and clarity of thought.

Since T₁ and T₃ leave the textual matter in a state of suspense, the issue must be decided between T₂, T₄, and T₅. The tradition supporting the

translated is that of the best and most recent edition, L. Minio - Paluello's edition in the Oxford Classical Text Series (1949, with corrections 1956)». Ackrill translates : «When things have only name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different, they are called **homonymous**. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different».

1) J. Tricot's French translation sides with T₂ and T₄. See, Aristotle, **Organon** : I **Categories**, II **De l' Interpretation**. Nouvelle traduction et notes par J. Tricot, (Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1946), p. 2. In p. v. the author writes ; [Nous avons utilisé de préférence le texte de Waitz, sauf dans un certain nombre de passages où nous avons préféré la leçon de Bekker ; les principales variantes ont été indiquées dans les notes]. The omission of **ousia** is indicated in p. 2, note 1. Tricot's translation of the passage has as follows : «On appelle homonymes les choses dont le nom seul est commun, tandis que la notion désignée par ce nom est diverse». Despite the fact that Ackrill and Tricot translate from different editions, Ackrill calls Tricot's version of the **Categories** and **De Interpretatione** more reliable than either the Oxford, (T₂) or the Loeb (T₃) versions. See Ackrill, **op. cit.**, 158.

2) Boethius of Sidonos (fl. c. 40 B. C.), a leading Peripatetic and like his contemporary Andronicus, thought it unnecessary to preserve in his version of the **Categories** the $\tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ part. Philoponus informs us that Andronicus was the teacher of Boethius (In **Categ. Prooemium**, **CAG**. Vol. 13, 4, 15ff). It appears that we might have to go further back to discover the antecedents of the shorter text ; for Georke, for instance, does not completely trust the critical and editorial abilities of Andronicus. Georke suggest, that the critical notes pertaining to the reading of **Cat.** 3 a 2,

set T₂, T₄ goes back to Boethus ², and by way of modern authorities, to Waitz ¹. Ancient opinion was divided on this issue, but the majority of commentators favored the reading **L of O**. Andronicus and Boethus are mentioned as being against it ². In favor of **L of O** were Nicostratus ³, Herminius, Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius ⁴, Philoponus, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, and Elias, and also Photius in his paraphrase of the **Categories**. The analysis of the arguments these commentators offer constitutes a separate matter and must be exclu-

since they do not stand in all our copies, go back perhaps to the apparatus of Tyrannion (Pauly - Wissowa, **Realencyclopädie** Vol. 1—2, Col 2, 2166). Tyrannion, a contemporary of Cicero, is said to have brought to light and collected the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, which Sulla had taken as his personal booty from the first Mythridatic war. He wrote a work *Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν*. Simplicius in his commentary (**In Categ.** 29. 5) mentions that Speusippus was the first to take the view that **homonyma** can be defined by saying simply ὁ δὲ λόγος ἕτερος. Thus, there is some ground for entertaining the hypothesis that the commentators who do not favor the **L of O** reading have been influenced by Speusippus' theory and definition of **homonyma**. Boethius (480—525) should be included in their ranks. Simplicius defends **L of O** and, furthermore he chides Boethus and argues against the Speusippean approach to homonymy. Simplicius' argument, in summary, goes something like this: if Speusippus is right, then the distinction between **homonyma** and **synonyma** breaks down on the ground that on that definition all **synonyma** are **homonyma** and vice versa; evidently, Simplicius remarks, Speusippus not only omitted **tes ousias** but went as far as to reduce the definition to just ὁ δὲ λόγος ἕτερος. If Simplicius' testimony is reliable historical report, it would seem that the definition and theoretical explanation of **homonyma** were issues of considerable philosophic debate. The fact that Aristotle discusses many aspects of **homonyma** in his **Topics** should be regarded as additional evidence that such was the case.

1) **Aristotelis Organon graece**, edited with commentary by Th. Waitz, (Leipzig, 1844—1846), 2 vols., cf. the scholia in Vol. 1, 269—271.

2) Simplicius reports that the expression does not occur in all the copies he has seen, but mentions only those of Boethus and Andronicus (**In Categ.** 30, 3—5). Dexippus also admits that this reading does not occur in all the copies, and mentions only those of Boethus and Andronicus as cases in point. He says the expression **L of O** is favored by most (παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις) and adds that Aristotle did well to put it that way (**In Categ.** 21, 18—22).

3) Mentioned in **Simpl.** 29, 25. Simplicius refers to Nicostratus; he draws attention to a special difficulty in the use of **ousia**, namely, whether it is proper to extend the term to include the accidents. Nicostratus, evidently, took the position that homonymy must be restricted to substance only. Simplicius, arguing against him, points out that there is homonymy in the case of quality (white; color, voice), position, and other categories.

4) Ammonius' accounts present a special problem though not by any means unsurmountable. In his commentary on Porphyry's **Eisagoge**, **ousia** is not mentioned in the scholium where he discusses the relationship of homonymy and synonymy to beings (**onta**, 84, 6—23). This omission is rather odd especially in view of the fact that the much admired Porphyry had been an ardent defender of **L of O**. As expected, in his commentary on the **Categories**, Ammonius supports as best as he can the **L of O**. See his scholium on 1a 2 (**In Categ.** 20, 14—21, 2).

ded from our present discussion. To return to our theme, the context of the **L of O** in **Cat.** Ch. 1, is the doctrine of **homonyma**. Since for Aristotle scientific knowledge is not of individuals, and since the proper application of the syllogistic principle presupposes that synonymy and the continuity from the major term to the minor is already made secure, it is imperative that homonymy of terms be decisively dealt with in order (a) to prevent logical error and (b) to determine under what conditions homonymy is acceptable and why. Whereas (a) is more fundamental to the **Categories**, (b) looms more significantly in other logical and metaphysical treatises. We know that Aristotle's ontology provides for legitimate cases of homonymy. Hence it is vital to his metaphysical investigations, the analyses that come under what will eventually be called *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, that the sort of homonymy which pertains to principles be brought into the open. There are certain key terms in his categorial theory that clearly constitute cases of homonymy. We use «genus», for instance, to mean both secondary substance and the categories; similarly, «category» to mean not only that substance but the remaining categories as well; again, we use the «substance» both in the case of the particular and the universal, though the two are far from identical; «being» (**to on**), again, is an instance of homonymy¹.

If the doctrine of **homonyma** has a certain basic importance to it, then, the issue becomes one of ascertaining the relevance of the expression **L of O** in formulating the logical character of homonymy. The position this paper defends has been in its main features favored by the leading ancient commentators, though the interpretations they attached to it were conceived in the light of a number of non-Aristotelian considerations and philosophical commitments. But when we turn to the English translations of the passage, we are hardly given any instruction to suspect that there might be certain doctrinal and technical restrictions. For reasons given in the remainder of this paper, T₂ and T₄ must be dismissed as implying unacceptable readings. T₁ and T₃ are somewhat preferable but are still riding the fence. T₅ falls short of the target for by using the term «being» without any other qualification it does not distinguish between **ousia** and **on**, especially since **ta onta** is used homonymously later on in the text to refer to what all the categories denote.

Before presenting the grounds for our position, it behooves to state here what seems to be the function of the opening chapters of the **Categories**. If the main issue for Aristotle is to establish the meaning of **first substance** and

1) Dexippus remarks that the distinction between **homonyma** and **synonyma** is fundamental to the exposition of the categories; **to on**, «being» he points out, is a homonymous expression and refers to all the categories. This means that **to on** must not be taken to mean a **summum genus**. Grote correctly interprets Dexippus to mean (a) that **to on** does not comprehend the categories in the sense that these are «distinct species under it», and (b) that «each category is a genus in reference to its particulars», Aristotle, Vol. I, 82, note a; also 85, note a.

disentangle it from both subsisting substances (species and genera) and inhering accidental properties (the other categories), it would be the proper thing to use the introductory chapters to clear up obscurities due to unphilosophical use of homonymy and illicit predication. But this issue is not merely a logical and terminological problem; it becomes one of ontology as well. Thus our thesis rests on the hypothesis that the **Categories** offers an earlier version of Aristotle's ontology and that **L of O** is part of its requisite terminological apparatus. If it be objected that the opening part of the **Categories** offers no special clues as to doctrine, the reply may be given that the full import is realized only after the distinctions and concepts leading up to the ten categories and the ultimate subject of predication are fully presented.

Whatever else Aristotle might have meant by **L of O**, especially by **ousia**, for this is the debatable word, he could not have meant any of these: (i) first substance, (ii) summa genera (iii) differentia (iv) accidental properties. Thus, we can only conclude that if Aristotle used the term in some technical sense, he must have meant secondary substances as types and species, including the genera that are also species. Let us now consider the evidence.

The examples of **homonymy** and the language Aristotle uses suggest that he is talking about secondary substances. Of the two items named one is of the biological sort (man), the other of the world of artifacts (portrait). He seems to be talking about **sorts** of things. Three **prima facie** good reasons may be given here why **L of O** is used technically:

a) The commentators discuss the expression at length and, on the whole, consider **ousia** more appropriate than **onta** for denoting the grounds Aristotle intends to cover: secondary substances, primary substances and their properties.

b) Unless **ousia** has a technical meaning it would be difficult to defend **logos** in the sense of definition, and furthermore to explain why in the next few lines where he explains what we are expected to give when asked to provide the **L of O** in specific cases of **homonymy**, he uses idiomatic expressions characteristic of the technical terminology of formulating definitions of essences¹.

c) One has the impression that Aristotle is quite confident that his definition of **homonymy** is well stated, and the example much to the point. In fact he is quite certain that this case of **homonymy** cannot be reduced to one of **synonymy**; or, to put it differently, no definition of substance common to the sorts of things named in the example is forthcoming. Indeed, later on, when

1) Philoponus supplies the following definitions of the essences of the **homonymy** things in Aristotle's example (**In Categ.** 22, 18—19):

a) ἄνθρωπος, οὐσία ἐμψυχὸς αἰσθητική.

b) γεγραμμένον, μίμημα οὐσίας ἐμψύχου αἰσθητικῆς.

These two **legomena** constitute a case of homonymy for though they have the name «living» in common, there is no definable **ousia** which inheres in both.

the list of the **summa genera** of predication is given, artifacts are not mentioned under the category of substance.

However, the good reasons above do not prove conclusively the correctness of our thesis. Certain considerations, not to mention the fact that every ancient commentator extended **ousia** to cover individual men (Ajax, Achilleus, etc.) and that some of them went even further to include the accidentals as well, appear to militate against our interpretation. For instance, there is the problem of explaining why Aristotle referred to artifacts if he intended **ousia** to mean only definable secondary substances. Though it would not be too difficult to answer the issues it raises, actually the problem is not central to our quest. It is best, then, to proceed with our analysis and consider next a higher grade of evidence afforded by the texts.

Aristotle has repeatedly stated that the **homonyma** are not comparable (**ou symblēta**) ¹. Furthermore, he has made careful analysis of **legomena** that have many senses and are therefore **homonyma**. For instance, «the good» and other such expressions are treated in what seems to be a basic chapter in the **Topics** ².

He tells us there to look at the classes of predicates signified by a term and determine whether they are the same in all cases, and if not the same, to conclude that term involved is a **homonymon** ³. Another advice he gives to the same effect is this: look to discover whether the genera that come under the same name are at once different and not subaltern: τὰ γένη τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα, εἰ ἕτερα καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα.

It is the passage in **Topics** A 15 to which this paper appeals as evidence that in **Cat.** Ia 2 Aristotle means by **L of O** (a) **logos**=definition and (b) **ousia**=definable secondary substance. It should be noted that the example in the **Categories** parallels the one in the **Topics**. Thus, the **Topics** (A 15. 107a, 18—23):

... as (e. g.) 'donkey', which denotes both animal and the engine.

For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different:

for the one will be declared to be animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the definitions to be different ⁴.

Once again he mentions in this example two sorts of things, one living and

1) **Phys.** 248b 9, 17; 249a 4; 248a 11. **Top.** 107b 17. **Met.** 1080a 20; 1018a 5. **Nic. Eth.** 1133a 19.

2) **Top.** A 15. 106a 9ff.

3) **Top.** 107a 2—12.

4) Oxford translation. The Greek text reads: οἷον ὄνος τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ σκεῦος. ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος αὐτῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον ποῖόν τι ῥηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ σκεῦος ποῖόν τι, ἐὰν δὲ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τὰ γένη ᾗ, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέρους τοὺς λόγους εἶναι.

one artificial ¹. However, two difficulties must be removed before it can be claimed that the evidence cited supports our interpretation.

a) In the **Categories** the **homonyma** things are man and portraits of man ; the common name is 'animal' or 'living.' In the **Topics**, they are given as animal and engine, and the common name is 'donkey'. The difference is that in the **Categories** example the class animal includes man, whereas in the **Topics** the class donkey is included in animal. But this is not a real problem since homonymy does not depend on class inclusion but on mutual **categorical exclusion** of the sorts of things sharing a given name. In the **Categories** example, **zoon** is shared by living things and artifacts, hence their respective definitions must differ. The **Topics** example uses 'donkey' as the name that applies to both a sort of animal and a sort of artifact. The two sorts demand two different definitions. Actually, then, there is no logical difference between the **Categories** and the **Topics** examples. Aristotle could have used the **Topics** example in the **Categories** example provides for better contrast in the discussion of the difference between homonymy and synonymy there. In any event the examples are logically identical.

b) In the **Categories** and the **Topics** respectively, we have the following formulations of homonymy :

ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος (**Cat.** Ia 1—2).

ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος αὐτῶν (**Top.** 107b 20).

The **Topics** formulation is somewhat deceiving and hence might be regarded as supporting the Boethus - Waitz reading of the **Categories** which omits **tēs ousias**. But, as we saw, unless this expression is retained in the text of the **Categories** the danger of misunderstanding the intent is unavoidable. Since the **Topics** passage leaves no doubt that the things referred to are definable genera and sorts, it follows that it corresponds in both language and meaning to the **Categories** passage, which this paper interprets to mean secondary substances as definable via **genus differentia**.

Now, whereas the doctrine in the **Topics** A Ch. 15 is clearly stated, this is not so when we read the opening of the **Categories**. Hence, to omit **tēs ousias** is to make **logos** somewhat ambiguous, for if nothing else it might be taken to mean the definition of the name rather than the entities named. Since the word αὐτῶν in the **Topics** formulation is absent from its parallel one in **Categories**, and since what it refers to is clearly genera of sorts, we are per-

1) Compare also the example given in **Nic. Eth.** 2. 1129a 30. ὁμωνύμως καλεῖται ἡ κλεις ἥ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.

mitted to conclude that the two passages are genuinely parallel in doctrine. Therefore, the expression **L of O** has a technical meaning ¹.

1) **Contre** J. Owens who writes : «The opening chapter of the **Categories** fails to reveal whether it is introducing a grammatical, a logical, or a metaphysical treatise. It deals with equivocals and univocals and ends with a definition of paronyms». See his article «Aristotle on Categories», **The Review of Metaphysics**, Vol. XIV (1960), No. 1, p. 74. In footnote 5, he further states : «For Aristotle, equivocals and univocals refer primarily to things, and only secondarily to conceptual expressions and words, as I have tried to show in **The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics** (Toronto : Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), pp. 49—63». Owens' view rests on the assumption that Aristotle is not stating a special doctrine couched in appropriate terminological language in the «puzzling» Chapter 1 of the **Categories**. The relationship of the doctrine of **homonyma** to the theory of syllogism is precisely what in our view provides the key to appreciating the technical significance and function of the opening chapter. Evidently, the ancient commentators did not find **Cat.**, Chapter 1 as deficient in clarity of intent as Owens does ; their errors stem primarily from the liberties they took in over-extending the meaning of the passage under consideration to cover Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian teachings.